by Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives

Since the onset of the US "global war on terrorism", the operational capacity of the original "Al Qaeda" centered around Osama bin-Laden has been significantly degraded. Hundreds of cadre formerly commanded by bin-Laden have been killed (mostly during the Afghan war). Several top leaders of the organization have been killed or captured – most notably Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – as have several leading regional associates, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Dozens of third tier operatives have been killed or captured. Nonetheless, the organization continues to function in a more decentralized form.

Bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to provide guidance and encouragement to their followers, having issued 35 video and audio recordings from their redoubt in Pakistan. Since 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda has directed, financed, or played a role in 30 fatal operations in 12 countries causing 2500 casualties including 440 deaths. These figures, from the Rand-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, do not include the activities of al-Zarqawi in Iraq, nor do they include the activities of independent groups friendly to al-Qaeda.

On a global scale: terrorist activity and violence has grown worse, not better since 11 September 2001. Average levels of terrorist violence that would have been considered extreme in the period prior to 9/11 have become the norm in the years since. And there is no sign that this trend is abating. This much is evident from a review of the terrorism incident database maintained by the Rand Corporation for the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), which is funded by the US Department of Homeland Security. Surveying incidents for the period January 1998 through 11 August 2006 shows that:

• The rate of terrorism fatalities for the 59 month period following 11 September 2001 is 250 percent that of the 44.5 month period preceding and including the 9/11 attacks. This figure has been adjusted to account for the different length of the two periods and it implies an increase in average monthly fatalities of 150 percent. (Only in January 1998 did the database begin to include both national and international terrorism incidents.)
 
• The rate of terrorist incidents for the post-9/11 period is 268 percent that of the period prior to and including 11 September 2001. This implies a 167 percent increase in what might be called the average monthly rate of incidents.
 
• A fair portion of the increased activity is related to the war in Iraq – but not all. Removing Iraq from the picture shows an increase in the average monthly rate of terrorism fatalities of more than 10 percent for the post-9/11 period. The increase in the rate of incidents not counting Iraq is 75 percent.
  
  Another way of analyzing the data is to treat the 9/11 attacks as a dependent variable or as a "pivot point". This allows us to ask: "What was the baseline incidence of terror prior to 9/11 and how has it changed since?" The baseline prior to 9/11 is indicative of the level of organization, capability, and activity that eventually expressed itself in the 9/11 attacks.
 
• Removing 9/11 from the picture shows a 300 percent increase in fatalities for the post-9/11 period (including Iraq) or an 80 percent increase (excluding Iraq) when compared with the pre-9/11 period. The comparable change with regard to incidents is 168 percent increase with Iraq and 76 percent increase without.

It is also worth noting, that if we divide the post-9/11 period into two equal halves (not shown in table), the number of terrorism fatalities is greater in the second half than in the first – even when Iraq is excluded: approximately 4772 fatalities in the first half versus approximately 5177 in the second. Thus: there is no support in this data for the proposition that the post-9/11 surge in terrorism fatalities is abating.