Earlier this week, the International Crisis Group, released a new report titled “In their own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency” that seeks to provide a better understanding of the Iraqi insurgency by examining their rhetoric and propaganda. The report describes the insurgency as becoming increasingly confident of their capacity to defeat the United States and suggests that the insurgency’s capacity to survive despite a militarily strong counter-insurgency campaign suggests that the insurgency has political support and military skill. The International Crisis Group acknowledges the limitations of a study focused solely on external communications without knowing the inner workings of the insurgency, but the rhetoric leads to a number of important conclusions:
- The insurgency increasingly is dominated by a few large groups with sophisticated communications. It no longer is a scattered, erratic, chaotic phenomenon. Groups are well organised, produce regular publications, react rapidly to political developments and appear surprisingly centralised.
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There has been gradual convergence around more unified practices and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab identity. A year ago groups appeared divided over practices and ideology but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances. For now virtually all adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism and patriotism, diluting distinctions between foreign jihadis and Iraqi combatants – though that unity is unlikely to outlast the occupation.
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Despite recurring contrary reports, there is little sign of willingness by any significant insurgent element to join the political process or negotiate with the U.S. While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its “collaborators”.
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The groups appear acutely aware of public opinion and increasingly mindful of their image. Fearful of a backlash, they systematically and promptly respond to accusations of moral corruption or blind violence, reject accusations of a sectarian campaign and publicise efforts to protect civilians or compensate their losses. Some gruesome and locally controversial practices – beheading hostages, attacking people going to the polls – have been abandoned. The groups underscore the enemy’s brutality and paint the U.S. and its Iraqi allies in the worst possible light: waging dirty war in coordination with sectarian militias, engaging in torture, fostering the country’s division and being impervious to civilian losses.
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The insurgents have yet to put forward a clear political program or long-term vision for Iraq. Focused on operations, they acknowledge this would be premature and potentially divisive. That said, developments have compelled the largest groups to articulate a more coherent position on elections, and the prospect of an earlier U.S. withdrawal than anticipated is gradually leading them to address other political issues.
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The insurgency is increasingly optimistic about victory. Such self-confidence was not there when the war was conceived as an open-ended jihad against an occupier they believed was determined to stay. Optimism stems from a conviction the legitimacy of jihad is now beyond doubt, institutions established under the occupation are fragile and irreparably illegitimate, and the war of attrition against U.S. forces is succeeding.
With insurgent attacks increasing 30% in the past few weeks, the report comes at an important time and offers a number of suggestions for combating the insurgency:
To the United States and its Coalition and Iraqi Allies:
- Closely monitor, control and, if necessary, punish the behaviour of security forces.
- Halt recourse to the most questionable types of practices, including torture and extraordinary methods of interrogation and confinement, collective punishment and extrajudicial killings.
- End the use of sectarian militias as a complement to, or substitute for, regular armed forces and begin a serious process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of militia fighters.
To the United States:
- Hold the new government accountable and make clear that longer-term relations, economic assistance and future military cooperation will depend on the steps it takes to rein in and ultimately disband militias, halt politically motivated killings, and respect human rights and the rule of law.
- Make clear its willingness, while it remains in Iraq, to negotiate openly the terms of its presence and its rules of engagement.
- Make clear repeatedly and at the highest level that it accepts that the oil resources of the country belong to the Iraqi people and no one else, and will withdraw from Iraq as soon as the newly elected government so requests.
Related posts:
- Iraq Watch: More on the Election, the Iraqi Insurgency after the Election, Seeds Require Licensing, Local Comapnies Profiting from War
- Iraq Watch: Outsourcing the War, Iraqi Children Malnurished, Report on Failure of the so-called Transition
- New Report Addresses “Extremist” Rhetoric in Immigration Debate
- Recent Pentagon Report Provides Limited Estimate of Iraqi Civilian Casualties
- Ehlers Claims it “is False” to Describe him as an “Ardent” Supporter of the Iraq War
